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I. Engelhardt’s development of the moral situation
Tris Engelhardt’s After God is a great book, not only for its size (454 pag-es), but mainly for the richness of analysis and intuition. It also contains an intellectual autobiography which provides a lot of personal impressions 
that affected his cultural development and that will be of the utmost importance to 
reconstruct Engelhardt’s thinking. It is perhaps too early to try such an enterprise, 
but one thing is sure: Engelhardt admits that his research was gradual and at times he
“was confronted with puzzles. They were foundational puzzles about the 
roots of bioethics and of morality generally. Prominent among these ques-
tions were what it means to acknowledge the existence of God, and what 
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difference the acknowledgement of God does or should make in how one 
lives one’s life” (p. 34).1
This is a basic and crucial point, because Engelhardt informs us that the “foun-
dational puzzles about the roots of bioethics and of morality” accompanied all of 
his intellectual life. As a matter of fact, he had the privilege to live through one of 
the most dramatic and massive changes that have occurred in human history. Engel-
hardt’s youth was still in a world unaffected by the Biomedical Revolution, and he is 
aware of it and describes the situation in a short and wonderful presentation:
“It was 1954. I had arrived in Europe for the first time, indeed in Genoa. In 
that early June, bright with flowers, a joy for my mother, I entered a world 
that was a universe apart from the Europe of the second decade of the 21st 
century. The moral and metaphysical texture of the then-dominant life-
world was radically different. There was a pronounced folk piety. Italy’s 
streets were full of young priests and children. Everywhere there were grey 
and black friars. Italy was young, generally pious, and dynamic (although 
side chapels were at times marked by signs bearing an astonishing warning: 
Vietato urinare). The churches were not empty. These observations are not 
meant to deny the presence even then of the roots of the now-dominant 
secular culture. Italy had its full share of agnostics and atheists. However, 
Italy was then just before, but still surely before, a major and dramatic 
cultural tipping point. Vatican II (1962–1965), the sexual revolution of 
the late 1960s, the student protests beginning in 1968, and the general 
impact of the Frankfurter Schule would soon precipitate a comprehensive 
secularization. However, this transformation had not yet taken place. I was 
in a cultural lull before widespread turbulence and change. It was not yet a 
culture after God.” (p. 57).
At the cultural level, the big change started in the ’60s, and it was a real shock 
and an amazing social struggle. But it was also the peak of the Golden Age of the 
Short Century, the age of the New Frontier of Science and Rights, the age of the 
dialysis and heart transplant, as well as of the conquest of the Moon. It was also the 
decade of the beginning of mass secularization, as the young sociologist Peter Berger 
noted in 1969: “Probably for the first time in history, the religious legitimations of 
the world have lost their plausibility not only for a few intellectuals and other mar-
ginal individuals, but for broad masses of entire societies” [quoted by Engelhardt at 
p. 128]. Berger immediately perceived that the new situation “opened up an acute 
crisis not only for the nomination of the large social institutions but for that of in-
1 All the quotations are from H.T. Engelhardt Jr., After God: Morality and Bioethics in a Secular 
Age (Yonkers, New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2017).
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dividual biographies. In other words, there has arisen a problem of ‘meaningfulness’ 
not only for such institutions as the state or the economy, but for the ordinary rou-
tines of everyday life” (pp. 128-129). However, these negative aspects appeared to 
be minor troubles compared to the new possibilities opening up. In The Secular City 
(1965), Harvey Cox regarded secularization as integral to “the liberation of man 
from religious and metaphysical tutelage, the turning of his attention away from oth-
er worlds and toward this one” (Engelhardt p. 128). In short, optimism prevailed over 
pessimism, and the positive attitudes towards the future lasted for the next decades. 
Even in the ’70s and ’80s serious moral and social quandaries were described as mere 
challenges to be faced and overcome. 
In the ’80s, when Engelhardt elaborated one of his masterpieces, the first edition 
of The Foundations of Bioethics (1986), he was under this impulse. The book was a 
sort of great thought-experiment in order to test the limits of reason alone in ethics. 
He informs us that he was denounced for heresy within the Catholic Church, and that 
“[t]he accusations were discounted when [he] responded to a committee appointed 
to review the issue” (p. 40) that The Foundations of Bioethics (1986), and his work 
in general, had to be understood “to have explored only that which can be known by 
reason unaided by grace.” (p. 40). In this sense he was interpreted “to be an extreme 
theological liberal” (p. 40), and a few years later his “work received a condemnation 
in La Civiltà Cattolica (Editorial 1992). Some Roman Catholic critics even regarded 
The Foundations of Bioethics as taking a utilitarian position, mirabile factu, similar to 
that of Peter Singer” (p. 42)
Of course, Engelhardt never was [or had been] a utilitarian in strict and technical 
terms: from the beginning it was crystal clear that he was a kind of contractarian put-
ting individual autonomy at the core of his reflection. However, he could be under-
stood as a utilitarian in a wider sense, because his proposal was devoted to explore 
“only that which can be known by reason unaided by grace” (p. 40), i.e., by reason 
alone, as requested in and by a secular environment. As a matter of fact, arguing from 
that [secular] point of view, Engelhardt concurred with Peter Singer on some practical 
conclusions, such as the moral permissibility of abortion. Of course, we knew well 
that the arguments justifying the conclusion were different, but being in the midst of 
a culture war, that aspect appeared irrelevant: in 1991, the Italian translation of “The 
Foundations was at a white-hot point of collision between a Roman Catholic and a 
post-Christian Italy” (p. 33). At that time, in the late decades of the xxth century, the 
teaching of John Paul II was at the apex, and the climate was that in which the encyc-
lical Evangelium Vitae was prepared. Not to be in line with the traditional Catholic 
teaching was considered equivalent to being against it. That is the reason for which 
the first edition of The Foundations “engendered a controversy that reached into the 
public media” (p. 33). Engelhardt was perceived as the liberal philosopher who could 
provide a perspective apt to permit a peaceful social life for “moral strangers”. This 
was the magic expression which catalyzed the attention: “moral strangers” are the 
inhabitants of our secularized societies, people who do not speak the same moral lan-
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guage and, therefore, do not understand each other, but they can still live peacefully. 
And Engelhardt tried to elaborate a moral theory embedded in (secular) “rationality” 
in order to show that each individual could be free to express one’s own perspective 
and still live peacefully. His proposal was fascinating not only for the many referenc-
es to classical European philosophy which were appealing to educated people, but 
also because it opened applications for the political arena. The idea of a “free and 
peaceful island for moral strangers” became a sort of new utopia for many countries 
in which secularization was crawling in practice without receiving cultural recogni-
tion. For this reason, the first edition of The Foundations of Bioethics had immense 
success, and it is interesting that the French edition was published when the second 
edition was already available: it was the proposal needed for “public reasons”. 
In his short autobiography, Engelhardt presents the threads underlying his work 
and provides explanations for his proposals, stressing the unitary frame of his re-
search. In light of his reconstruction, it is quite possible that his book was grossly 
misinterpreted. But there is also another possibility, i.e., that Engelhardt’s thinking 
went through different stages and accents, and that he might also have changed his 
views on some aspects. It is too difficult to examine the point here, and I leave this 
task to others. However, my hypothesis is that starting from the ’90s, Engelhardt’s 
reflection entered into a new stage, so that the late Engelhardt of After God (2017) 
is significantly different from that of The Foundations (1986). Here is one point to 
support such a statement: in 1986, Engelhardt coined the expression “moral strang-
ers” and tried to elaborate a moral theory to make them live together in a peaceful 
way. In After God, the late Engelhardt starts taking for granted that “Bioethics pro-
vides some of the most important battles in the culture wars” (p. 12), so that the old 
moral strangers transformed themselves in “moral enemies”. Such a war can assume 
different forms, and become “guerrillas”, but the root depends on the fact “that the 
substance of bioethics will still be known by traditional Christians to be anchored in 
the will of God. This knowledge will perpetuate the culture wars” (p. 24). 
Since Engelhardt’s intellectual progression was similar to that of many other im-
portant scholars, I dare to try and offer a brief explanation for such a shift. The start-
ing point is the historical process of the Biomedical Revolution, which started after 
the Second World War and came to the fore in the ’60s. What I call the “Biomedical 
Revolution” is that huge phenomenon which is the continuation of the Industrial 
Revolution. As Eric Hobsbawm remarked, the Industrial Revolution was the greatest 
transformation of human history of which we have written documents. As the Indus-
trial Revolution provided control over inorganic nature, the Biomedical Revolution 
aims to provide control over organic nature.2 
Bioethics as an academic discipline started the next decade, in the ’70s, as the 
2 For an analysis of the relevance of the Biomedical Revolution and its connections with the 
Industrial Revolution, see. M. Mori, Manuale di Bioetica: Verso una Civiltà Biomedica Secolariz-
zata (Firenze: Le Lettere, 20132).
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systematic cultural reflection on what had happened and what was going on.3 Often 
those epochal transformations are mixed up with many other phenomena, such as 
the space programs, feminism and the civil rights movement, and start in a piece-
meal way. This last issue is particularly important, since it is sometimes difficult to 
perceive the paradigmatic shift that one single change brings with it, or produces. At 
its beginnings, bioethics was involved in analyzing single issues, and one of the most 
debated was the moral permissibility of abortion. However, at that time abortion 
required medical intervention and was seen as the last resort to women in difficult 
situations. Analogously, assisted reproduction through IVF [In Vitro Fertilization] 
still had an uncertain future and was primarily seen as a remedy for infertility, and not 
as an alternative method of reproduction. In that situation, bioethics was a sort of 
adjustment of the traditional moral frame: disagreements were deep and lively, but 
limited to specific moral issues. On the other hand, it was clear that morality had to 
be secular, but that was not seen as a threat to religion. Purified from the magical and 
superstitious aspects, religion would remain a respectable option: secularization was 
perceived as a positive process of liberation. In this context, it was perfectly correct 
for Engelhardt to try to elaborate, on the assumption of reason alone, a set of moral 
rules apt to guarantee a peaceful social life geared toward autonomy and respect for 
individual freedom. In any case, this appeared to be the core message conveyed by 
Engelhardt. The first edition of The Foundations is one of the mature fruit of the first 
stage of bioethics.
In the ’90s, the general situation started to change. Events such as the fall of the 
Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989) and the consequent end of the USSR, the first Gulf 
War (January 17 – February 28, 1991), and the birth of the European Union (Novem-
ber 1st, 1993) modified the geopolitical scenery (and possibly put an end to the Short 
Century).4 After the first decade of his long papacy which began in 1978, in which he 
had to fight against liberal opponents, pope John Paul II started to crown his program 
aimed at restoring traditional Roman Catholicism. One step was the Evangelium Vi-
tae (1995), an encyclical entirely devoted to bioethics, to contrast with, and combat, 
secular perspectives on the point. Secularization had in the meantime continued its 
process in the world. Not only is atheism now the fastest growing “religion”, but 
so-called neo-atheism claims that religion is dangerous and should be forbidden. 
While in the ’60s it was atheism that had to be accepted as a “respectable option”, 
3 For the distinction between bioethics as an academic discipline and bioethics as a cultural mo-
vement springing in society, see Maurizio Mori, “La ‘de-teologizzazione’ della Bioetica e la Na-
scita dell’Etica come Nuova Istituzione Specifica”, Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica 1 
(2015): 57-68 (translated into Brazilian as: “A desteologização da bioética e o nascimento 
da ética como nova instituição específica Idéias”, Idéias, Campinas 9, no.1 (2018): 287-304. 
For a more recent analyses of the consequences of the interplay of the two levels, see M. Mori, 
“Bioetica”, Aggiornamento Enciclopedia Utet (Torino: Utet, 2018), 93-100.
4 For a more detailed analysis of the history of bioethics from this general point of view, see 
the part that I wrote in the book G. Fornero and M. Mori, Laici e Cattolici in Bioetica: Storia e 
Teoria di un Confronto (Firenze: Le Lettere, 2012), 1-77.
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and in the ’70s it was taken for granted that as long as they were private options, any 
religion was “respectable”, now the situation is quite opposite: neo-atheists claim 
that religions are false beliefs to be forbidden. One religious reaction to this rapid 
and great growth of secularization was fundamentalism and a strong revival of tra-
ditional attitudes. This already explosive background was increased by the provisions 
of the Biomedical Revolution that came forward in the ’90s. It became clear that 
the new biomedical technologies were not limited to single aspects, but that it was 
going to affect the whole human existence, since control of life will bring about 
deep modifications of traditional arrangements. For instance, abortion was no longer 
proposed as an extreme remedy to a frightening situation for the woman, but started 
to be claimed as a woman’s human right, a claim expressed by the slogan: “Abortion 
on demand and without apology”. IVF had become a routine practice and started to 
be proposed as an alternative option for human reproduction. This brought about 
a radical modification of parental responsibility and of family structure. Surrogate 
pregnancies became frequent, as well as pressures in favor of equalitarian marriage. 
In February 1997, the announcement that Dolly the sheep was born on July 5, 1996 
through cloning was the straw that broke the camel’s back, because public opinion 
was scared of the new frontiers of science.
In this new context, Engelhardt started to reconsider his views. The first aspect 
is about secularization, which was incipient in the ’70-80s and pluralism could still 
reach a fair equilibrium: secular views were accepted at the intellectual level, but 
real social life was still informed by religious perspectives. Now, in the ’10s of the 
new century, secularization is a mature fruit and it is overwhelming. So he observes 
that “A new orthodoxy has been established, and it is secular. We have entered an 
age resolutely set “after God”. The contemporary dominant culture of the West is 
committed to acting as if God did not exist. The implications of this culture without 
God are vast” (p. 27). 
Granted that the cultural background is characterized by secular premises, new 
biomedical technologies such as IVF and stem cells are pervasive in all areas of life 
and not limited to only some specific parts. This means that ethical pluralism has 
become ubiquitous, and therefore intractable. As Engelhardt says, 
“[w]e are confronted with the core concerns and passages of life: sexuality, 
reproduction, suffering, dying, and death. But there is no agreement about 
how properly to live, have sex, reproduce, and die. As we have seen, in the 
dominant secular culture, possible decisions in these areas are reduced to 
life- and death-style choices, with morality itself becoming only a particu-
lar macro life-style choice and the state to being merely a modus vivendi, a 
political life-style choice” (p. 23). 
Engelhardt is very profound in the analyses of the current situation and very 
sharp in distinguishing the new aspects that characterize it, such as the new meaning 
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that “tolerance” has come to acquire in the last few decades. What I perceive as prob-
lematic are the proposed solutions to these issues that he examines. While in 1986 he 
tried to find a way to keep society together, now, in 2017, he strongly doubts that 
this is possible. So Engelhardt puts forth some pressing questions: “Is a society with 
such a “weak” account of morality, bioethics, and political authority sustainable? […] 
Is a society after God actually governable over the long run? Is a society fully with-
out God livable? And if so, in what sense?” (p. 23).
Of course these are rhetorical questions, because according to Engelhardt, in 
reality 
“[t]he epistemological and metaphysical roots of contemporary morality 
and therefore of bioethics that many thought were available through an 
anchor in being or in moral rationality, turn out not to exist. Once one 
abandons God, once one attempts to live after God, as if all were without 
ultimate meaning, one is set adrift within the horizon of the finite and the 
immanent. Secular morality and therefore bioethics cannot be what many 
had presumed” (pp. 23-24). 
In brief, the answer to those rhetorical questions is that after God the Great Fall 
will occur and society will break apart! The first Engelhardt was confident that a sec-
ular bioethics could develop a new way of living in order to allow for a peaceful and 
free society. The late Engelhardt examined the “complex and wide-ranging changes 
in the appreciation of what secular morality and its bioethics can be” (p. 24), and 
concluded 
“that the substance of bioethics will still be known by traditional Chris-
tians to be anchored in the will of God. This knowledge will perpetuate 
the culture wars. The content and the significance of religious morality and 
bioethics contrast with that of secular morality and its bioethics. The con-
flicts will not abate. As this book shows, in this culture after God, God’s 
powerful presence will endure in Orthodox Christianity” (p. 24). 
II. Elements for a short criticism of the late Engelhardt’s views.
As with any summary, the former outline is also reductive and cannot provide 
the richness of the original argumentation. However, I hope that it provides at least 
a general idea of the main issues that are at the basis of Engelhardt’s perspective. 
There appear to be two points that mostly attracted his attention: at the founda-
tional level, secularization initially appeared to be a sort of liberation, but ended 
up being a new orthodoxy threatening the traditional Christian civilization; at the 
contentful level, new customs concerning sexuality, family life and ending lives are 
seen as replacing the old enchanting religious rites, and this process was extremely 
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quick, so that people could not properly adjust to the change: the final result is a 
kind of moral chaos.
Engelhardt put it very directly:
“The Italy of the 1950s was an Italy that could not have conceived that 
there would soon be serious debates regarding the possibility of Roman 
Catholic priestesses and homosexual marriages, not to mention the pro-
priety of third-party-assisted reproduction with donor gametes, abortion, 
physician-assisted suicide, and euthanasia. This is not to say that in the 
1950s there was no abortion, fornication, adultery, active homosexuality, 
and even physician-assisted suicide. There surely was. However, the offi-
cial culture expected repentance for such acts, or at least the tribute of 
hypocrisy. […] The cardinal difference between then and now turns not just 
on a difference regarding certain norms, but much more on a change in the 
very nature of public morality. It turns not just on the force and meaning of 
norms, but on the contemporary requirement that the public square must be 
free of any mention of God. As a consequence, public moral discourse had 
a very different character. In the dominant culture of the West, and of Italy 
in particular, one could still be publicly judgmental regarding the morali-
ty, or better regarding the immorality, of abortion, fornication, adultery, 
homosexual acts, and physician-assisted suicide. Such adverse judgments 
were taken to have foundations, to be anchored in reality, in being itself. 
Moreover, one could publicly mention God. The culture I experienced in the 
1950s was a world in deep contrast with what one encounters today in the 
public space of the West, even in that of Texas” (pp. 59). 
Here we have a conjunction of the two levels of Engelhardt’s criticisms: secu-
larization modified, in depth, the nature of morality itself, and the conclusion was a 
change of moral norms so that the content of morality is different, and sometimes 
opposite. More briefly, “immanence has triumphed and the transcendent has been ex-
orcized. The discourse of sin has become politically unacceptable” (p. 61). This could 
occur because most aspects of the framework of our life-worlds have changed: our 
deep ontology concerning the structure of reality, our moral epistemology concern-
ing how we know the moral world, our sociology of moral experts that indicates who 
the scholars are that are appointed to give us moral advice, and finally our axiology, 
concerning the values itself and their hierarchy. The final result of the process is that 
the whole morality has become ultimately foundationless and has changed its role. 
Moral judgements do not prescribe what is required by the moral reality which is giv-
en, but have been transformed “into life-style and death-style choices, which are to 
be appreciated fully within the horizon of the finite and the immanent”.
My first disagreement with Engelhardt concerns the idea that the new morality 
underlying bioethics would be “ultimately foundationless”. One can say this only 
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if it is taken for granted that the only possible foundation is in reality, or in the 
being itself. However, this solution is destined to be inadequate because the reality, 
or the being itself which is assumed to serve as the foundation of morality, is the 
biological being. But, as I mentioned before, we are living at the time of the Biomed-
ical Revolution, which is the continuation of the Industrial Revolution. As the latter 
made it possible for humans to control inorganic nature, the Biomedical Revolution 
is enabling human control of organic nature: the past centuries have been the time 
of civil, mechanical and electrical engineering, while our time is one of genetic and 
biomedical engineering. This means that we realize that the supposed stable and im-
mutable “being itself” is no longer so, since we can modify it according to our needs 
and wants. For this reason, morality cannot be grounded in the biological reality, but 
this does not entail that morality is necessarily foundationless. Even without being a 
utilitarian in the strict sense of the term, morality can be founded on the welfare of 
sentient beings. 
A morality based on such a new foundation can have analogous functions in so-
ciety, even if it is something else, since moral decisions have been transformed “into 
life-style and death-style choices” which do not have an impact on eternal life, but 
they “are to be appreciated fully within the horizon of the finite and the immanent”. 
This is true, and this is an epoch-making change. Morality is like a language, and the 
change of a language with the creation of a new one is an enormous and complex 
phenomenon. But this shouldn’t frighten us: in one sense the process is in line with 
our times and should be welcome.
In order to understand why we should face this challenge with confidence and 
positive attitudes, without being frightened, I would like share just a few remarks. If it 
true that, as Eric Hobsbawm used to say, the Industrial Revolution was the most fun-
damental transformation in human history, then we have to realize that we are also 
experiencing a tremendous change. Possibly, the transformation that we are witness-
ing is even more profound and deeper than the one experienced in the past centuries. 
As I have hinted, the Biomedical Revolution is the continuation of the Industrial Rev-
olution, but in some sense it is even more profound than the former. The Biomedical 
Revolution comes together with other extraordinary events, such as the information 
and robotic revolutions, which are synergetic with the same goal: human control of 
life. While the Industrial Revolution aimed at the control of inorganic nature, the 
Biomedical Revolution aspires to control the organic one, i.e., life itself: the former 
was about modifying the external environment of life in general and human beings 
specifically, while the latter points directly to modifying the internal environment of 
life, and even of humans. This would be enough to support my statement that the 
Biomedical Revolution is even more profound than the Industrial one. Moreover, life 
is what we are constituted of, and, therefore, strong feelings are rooted in whatever 
pertains to life and is connected with it. This means that interventions in the organic 
nature raise very passionate, if not violent, reactions in the public. People are bewil-
dered and frightened by the idea that life can be forged by human intervention. This, 
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in fact, is a new possibility that may radically change the course of history and the 
very structure of our existence.
Just to give an idea of the magnitude of the phenomena we are speaking of, I can 
say that the Industrial Revolution was something much greater than, for instance, the 
passage from the Medieval age to the Modern one: possibly it was something com-
parable to the Neolithic revolution, i.e., the passage from the state of nomadic being 
to the residential, with the beginning of what we call “civilization”. To elaborate this 
point, I can say that we are living at the time of transition from history to post-histo-
ry: in fact, “pre-history” was the time in which no writing could register the events; 
“history” is the time where written documents testified to the occurrence of the most 
important events; and now “post-history” is the time where almost everything is go-
ing to be recorded and where life itself is under human control. My hypothesis is that 
we are facing a transition which is greater than any other change, because the control 
of life allows a new kind of setting.
If we consider the moral storm that we are facing, we shouldn’t be too surprised 
to find ourselves living in a sort of “moral chaos”. This situation is quite normal, 
because something similar occurs in our individual lives: when we have a shocking 
experience that modifies the structure of our existence, we live for a period in a kind 
of “suspensive vacuum” in which we do not know exactly what to think and do. Far 
from being on the edge of an abyss, I believe we are in a situation of departure for 
new directions. 
Certainly, the task is not easy to accomplish, because the elaboration of a new 
morality is a momentous enterprise. But we have an advantage to use in our task, 
and this is provided by the new conception of morality as one of the various norma-
tive institutions regulating our social life, and by the fruitful results given by ethical 
theorizing of the last centuries. Engelhardt is critical of all this when he remarks that 
“secular theoreticians of bioethics are reduced to serving as geographers of our on-
going controversies, unable to give any canonical moral guidance. They are like map-
makers or tour guides who can show us alternative moral and bioethical destinations, 
but who cannot tell us what destination one ought to choose, where one should go 
on the map” (p. 20). However, I think that this “second order” reflection marks the 
strength of recent moral thinking, because it enables us to provide a more consider-
ate moral guidance. This will not prevent bioethics from continuing to provide “some 
of the most important battles in the culture wars” (p. 12), but we can explain that 
such battles are the result of the persistence of “cultural survivals” that are tenacious 
and deeply rooted. 
In his descriptive part, Engelhardt’s last book is a masterpiece in portraying, or 
photographing, the passage of an epoch. But in his prescriptive proposal, I think that 
Engelhardt is too pessimistic, and he does not take the possibility that we are living 
in a time of a great transition seriously enough. Willy nilly, the future will be radi-
cally different from the past, and there is no point in being a laudator temporis acti, 
i.e., someone praising the old times in which things had another shape. Morality is 
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like fashion: being against a fashion (that sometimes appears to be the only fashion) 
doesn’t necessitate destroying all fashion, but simply starting a new fashion with its 
own styles and canons. To take another explicative analogy, morality stands to so-
cial life as the shadow stands to its object: the shadow can assume different shapes 
and intensities, but cannot be cancelled. This implies that our society can and will 
survive even without a morality founded on God, and our task is to find out a con-
tentful morality adequate for a society inhabited by moral strangers, as Engelhardt 
recognized.
A brief final remark concerning why ours is a society after God, the topic that 
is at the basis of Engelhardt’s contribution. The central aspect is the grand process 
of secularization, which in the last hundred years has become prominent. Secular-
ization is an extremely complex phenomenon, and this is the place to limit to only 
one observation. Certainly the crucial point of secularization is the disenchantment 
with of the world consequent to the scientific revolution and to the spread of a sci-
entific outlook. But there is another aspect to reflect upon. In the last century, life 
expectancy has doubled and now it is around 90 years. In rich countries people are 
sufficiently confident to live long enough as to realize their own life-plans. Secular-
ized people are not militant atheists against God, but they are simply after God, i.e., 
not interested in God. They are neither interested in whether God exists or not, nor 
in what He wants and commands for salvation, because they are too busy in pursuing 
their own human projects. God is beyond their preoccupations, because they assume 
that their own life is stable and safe enough so that they can postpone metaphysi-
cal speculations to a later time. The Biomedical Revolution has provided us enough 
blood analyses, scans of various sorts, surgery, diets, etc., to make people confident 
enough to control life for an adequate time, so that secularized people can lose, or 
disregard, their interest in God and religion.
If this short consideration is correct, then the increase of life expectancy is an-
other crucial factor engendering secularization. In fact, the timor mortis (or fear of 
death) is supposed to be one of the main springs of religion. According to Titus 
Lucretius Carus, as well as David Hume, religions are basically nourished by such 
an attitude. But our recent confidence in an adequate quantity of life expectancy 
is changing this basic feeling. Let us imagine what will be when our life expectancy 
will be at 250 or 400 years: for sure it is very difficult to strain our imagination to 
that point.5 However, in that case, it might be possible that the timor mortis will be 
replaced by the taedium vitae, boredom for life, so that people will be annoyed with 
continuing to live. Some indications in this direction are provided by very old people, 
over 90, who have lost all their peers, and even if they are in adequate physical con-
5 For some excellent analysis on these points see J. Harris, Genes, Clones, and Immortality: 
Ethics and the Genetic Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), and John Harris, 
“Immortal Ethics”, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1019, no. 1 (2004): 527-534.
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dition, seem to be less interested in living. 
In his book, Engelhardt repeats several times that once one abandons God, ev-
erything is without ultimate meaning, and therefore secular morality is destined to 
collapse. For sure, the morality of the future will be quite different from that of the 
past, which we know and study. However, meaning is not something that we discover 
in the world, or that is inscribed in the nature of things, but something that humans 
instill in their projects and life-plans. And it is very likely that they will continue to 
instill meanings even in a society after God. Such meanings will be set within the hori-
zon of the finite and the immanent, but hopefully it will be a horizon wide enough as 
to establish a morality which will produce more benefits for all then the old morality 
that we are acquainted with.
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